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ABSTRACT
This paper estimates the response of the unemployment rate and labor force participation rate to
exogenous variation in the youth share of the working age population, using cross-state variation in lagged
birth rates as an instrumental variable.  A one percent increase in the youth share reduces the unemployment
rate of young workers by more than one percent, and of older workers by more than two percent, holding
conditions in other states constant. It raises the labor force participation rate by about a third of a percent
for young workers, and by much less for older workers, again ceteris paribus.  These results are consistent
with increasing returns to scale (“thick market externalities”) in the labor market.  Young workers are
frequently mismatched in their employment, and firms create jobs to take advantage of this mismatch.  Data
on gross job creation and destruction in manufacturing support this theory.  I also reconcile these results
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1 Introduction
The baby boom has profoundly altered the demographic structure of the U.S. pop-
ulation during the past ﬁfty years. A number of authors have argued that this
anticipated supply shock can explain part or all ofthe secular changes in the unem-
ployment rate during this period. First Perry (1970) predicted that the entrance of
the baby boom cohort into the labor force would push up the unemployment rate
during the 1970s. Later, Flaim (1979) and Gordon (1982) conﬁrmed the increase,
and predicted declines during the 1980s, which were in turn conﬁrmed by Flaim
(1990) and Shimer (1998).
The eﬀects ofthe baby boom on unemployment can be grouped in two cate-
gories. First, since the aggregate unemployment rate is a weighted average ofthe
unemployment rates ofdiﬀerent age workers, demographic changes may alter the
weights and thus the aggregate unemployment rate without aﬀecting the age-speciﬁc
unemployment rates. Shimer (1998) ﬁnds that this ‘direct’ eﬀect ofthe baby boom
can account for about an eighty four basis point (0.84 percentage point) increase in
the aggregate unemployment rate from 1954 to 1978, and an eighty one basis point
decline from 1978 to 1998.
Second, changes in demographics may have ‘indirect’ eﬀects on age-speciﬁc un-
employment rates. For example, the conventional neoclassical growth model predicts
that an increase in the labor force growth rate will reduce the capital-labor ratio,
raising interest rates and lowering wages. Augmenting such a model with labor
market frictions, low wages may lead to high unemployment, for example if unem-
ployed workers reduce their search eﬀort. In addition, ifdiﬀerent age workers are
not perfect substitutes, an increase in the youth labor supply may have a diﬀerential
impact on young and old workers.1 Shimer (1998) estimates that the indirect eﬀects
ofthe baby boom were about as large as the direct eﬀect, so that the baby boom
caused a 180 basis point increase in the aggregate unemployment rate until 1980,
and a 145 basis point decrease in the subsequent years.
Unfortunately, while the direct eﬀect of this supply shock can be precisely es-
1This possibility has received considerable attention from labor economists. See the literature
review in Korenman and Neumark (1997).
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timated, most previous calculations ofthe indirect eﬀects ofthe baby boom use
conjectures based on time series evidence. For example, Shimer (1998) attributes
an increase in the youth unemployment rate relative to the prime age unemploy-
ment rate to the baby boom. Although the timing ofthis increase coincides with
the entrance ofthe baby boom into the labor market, at least two criticisms can
be levied at this attribution. First, there may have been coincident macroeconomic
ﬂuctuations that raised the youth unemployment rate relative to the prime age un-
employment rate in the 1970s and 1980s. Second, ifyoung and old workers are
complements in production, the baby boom may have simply reduced the unem-
ployment rate ofprime age workers. Ifthat is the case, the indirect eﬀects ofthe
baby boom at least partially oﬀset the direct eﬀects. It is impossible to reject these
possibilities using time series evidence from a single baby boom.
Recent work by Korenman and Neumark (1997) partially addresses these issues
by using time series data on unemployment rates for 15 countries. They look at the
relative unemployment rate ofyoung and old workers in an eﬀort to muﬄe the noise
introduced by country-speciﬁc macroeconomic shocks, and ﬁnd that an increase in
the youth share ofthe working age population raises the youth unemployment rate
relative to the prime age unemployment rate, with an elasticity ofapproximately
0.5. The use ofdata f rom multiple countries allows them to include time dummies in
their regression, thereby addressing the ﬁrst criticism. However, the use ofrelative
unemployment rates exposes it to the second: they cannot tell whether an increase
in the youth share ofthe labor f orce lowers the prime age unemployment rate or
raises the youth unemployment rate.
This paper’s innovation is to focus on data from within the U.S.. I use annual ob-
servations of unemployment rates from all ﬁfty states and the District of Columbia,
from 1978 to 1996. Because of the relatively large sample size and the relative irrel-
evance ofstate-speciﬁc macroeconomic shocks, I can tightly estimate the impact of
changes in the youth share ofthe population on youth and prime age unemployment
rates. Contrary to the existing literature, I ﬁnd that an increase in the youth share
ofthe working age population reduces the youth unemployment rate, with an elas-
ticity ofabout -1; and that the eﬀect on the prime age unemployment rate is even
-2-The Impact ofYoung Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market Robert Shimer
larger in magnitude. A one percent increase in the youth share ofthe population
reduces the prime age unemployment rate by more than two percent. Not only are
the signs ofthese estimates surprising, but the magnitudes are enormous, with an
(out ofsample) implication that the entry ofthe baby boom cohort into the labor
market should have halved the prime age unemployment rate!
One possible explanation for these results is that young workers migrate to states
with low unemployment rates. I control for the endogeneity of the youth share
using instrumental variables techniques. When I instrument the youth share with
appropriately lagged birth rates, I ﬁnd that the estimates do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from those found by ordinary least squares (OLS). Indeed, a speciﬁcation test fails to
reject the exogeneity ofthe youth share ofthe population. A number ofrobustness
checks conﬁrm the basic results.
Finally, I ﬁnd that an increase in the youth share ofthe population raises the
labor force participation rate rate for young workers, with an elasticity of about a
third. It has a smaller eﬀect on the participation rate ofolder workers, with an
elasticity ofaround 0.05. This implies that the employment-population ratio rises
for each group of workers.
The second task ofthis paper is to understand why an exogenous increase in the
youth share ofthe working age population leads to such a dramatic reduction in
unemployment rates and increase in participation. The change in the youth share
ofthe working age population represents an anticipated supply shock. Standard
theories predict that in response to an increase in the supply ofan input, its price
and utilization rate will decline. Yet the data indicate that labor utilization rates
increase in response to an increase in the youth labor supply.
I propose that in the presence ofsearch f rictions and increasing returns to scale,
labor markets with many young workers will be more ﬂuid. There is no inherent dif-
ference between young and old workers; however, it takes time to ﬁnd good matches,
and so younger labor markets will tend to have more workers who are mismatched in
their current employment. Firms will ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to participate in such
labor markets, boosting job creation and reducing the unemployment rate ofboth
young and old workers. In contrast, a labor market with mostly older workers is
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more rigid. By increasing the ﬂuidity ofthe labor market, an increase in the youth
share ofthe population also induces more workers to participate in the market,
consistent with the evidence.
A testable implication ofthis theory, is that labor markets with more young
workers should have more turnover. Since reliable worker ﬂow data does not exist
on a state level, I instead use state level job ﬂow data for the manufacturing sector
(Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh, 1996). I ﬁnd that a one percent increase in the
youth share ofthe population raises the job creation rate by 0.8 percent and the job
destruction rate by 0.7 percent, which supports the theory.
The third task is to reconcile the ﬁndings ofthis paper with the existing ‘cohort
crowding’ literature on the relationship between the youth share ofthe population
and the youth unemployment rate. I conﬁrm that one cannot ﬁnd the relationship
in the 15-country time series assembled by Korenman and Neumark (1997). But
this is not surprising, because cross-state data ignores other channels that lead to
an increase in the unemployment rate. As previously noted, an increase in the
growth rate ofthe labor f orce reduces the capital-labor ratio, raises unemployment
and reduces wages. Ifcapital ﬂows f reely across states, however, this eﬀect will not
appear in cross-state data; a large increase in the population growth rate in one state
will cause a modest reduction in the capital-labor ratio in all states, which I will
pick up as a year ﬁxed eﬀect and interpret as a macroeconomic shock. In contrast,
to the extent that capital ﬂows imperfectly across national borders, this eﬀect will
appear in the cross-country panel regression using Korenman and Neumark’s (1997)
data. General equilibrium interactions may also rationalize why the entry ofthe
baby boom into the labor force did not lead to a ﬁfty percent decline in the U.S.
unemployment rate.
Section 2 describes the data used in the main empirical analysis, whose results
are presented in Section 3. Section 4 argues that the endogeneity off ertility decisions
is unlikely to explain these results. Instead, I develop a simple model in Section 5
that illustrates how an increase in the youth share ofthe population can reduce
the unemployment rate by increasing the ﬂuidity ofthe labor market. Section 6
oﬀers a simple test ofthis theory using job creation and destruction data f rom
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manufacturing. Section 7 reconciles these results with existing evidence on the
relationship between the youth share ofthe population and labor market conditions.
Section 8 concludes by exploring the broader implications ofthe ﬁndings.
2D a t a
The main empirical analysis draws on cross-state diﬀerences in birth rates within
the U.S., and the consequent impact on the youth share ofthe population and
on unemployment and participation rates. The basic source ofunemployment and
participation rate data is the Current Population Survey (CPS), which is designed
to yield an accurate description ofthe national labor market. The Bureau ofLabor
Statistics (BLS) has estimated state unemployment and participation rates since
1970 by augmenting the CPS with information from the unemployment insurance
system and ‘time series modeling’.2 This yields an oﬃcial series for the state rates,
which is publically available from the BLS web site <http://stats.bls.gov/>.I n
addition the BLS computes (but does not make generally available) data on state
unemployment and participation rates for diﬀerent age cohorts from 1978 to 1996,
my primary sample period.
The Census Bureau produces annual estimates ofthe number ofworkers in each
state in many diﬀerent age cohorts, supplementing the decennial census. Although
the BLS also produces analogous numbers, BLS and Census data are surprisingly
diﬀerent. To avoid any measurement error that might be correlated with measure-
ment error in the BLS unemployment rate estimates, I use Census data for the age
structure ofthe population.
The third source of data is birth rate data for each state from 1954 to 1980 (16
to 24 years before my sample period). This data comes from various years of the
Statistical Abstract ofthe United States, and is measured in births per thousand
people. Whenever possible, I use birth rates corrected for undercounting, rather
than the oﬃcial birth census.
2Time series models are used for 41 small states. Unemployment rates are calculated directly
from the CPS in the ten largest states (California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas). I return to the importance of the estimation
procedure in the robustness checks.
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3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Empirical Model
The unemployment rate varies substantially over time. At a national level, it av-
eraged 7.5% during the ﬁrst halfofthe sample period, and f ell to 6.1% during the
second half. The age structure of the population shows similar temporal variation,
with the share ofyouths, 16 to 24 year olds, in the working age population, 16 to 64
year olds, declining from 26.3% at the beginning of the sample to 18.9% at the end.
Given the importance ofmacroeconomic shocks during this time period, it would
be na¨ ıve to interpret this correlation causally.
Similarly, unemployment and demographics show considerable cross-sectional
variation. The youth share ofthe working age population averaged 27.1% in Missis-
sippi and 22.3% in Connecticut during the sample period, while the state unemploy-
ment rates averaged 7.9% and 6.0% respectively. It is not obvious whether there is
a causal relatonship, and ifso, in which direction the causation goes.
To avoid these issues, I do diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence estimation. The empirical
model looks at how the unemployment rate and labor force participation rate in
state i and year t depend on state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and on the youth share
ofthe working age population, share it, deﬁned as the number of16–24 year olds
divided by the number of16–64 year olds:
lograteit = αi + βt + γ logshareit + εit (1)
where the dependent variable rateit is either the unemployment or participation rate
in state i and year t,a n dε represents other sources ofvariation in the dependent
variable, such as state-speciﬁc economic shocks, which are orthogonal to the youth
share ofthe population. 3
3Other papers studying the behavior of state employment and unemployment rates do not
include any other exogenous variables in the regression (Blanchard and Katz, 1992). There are a
few papers that study the determinants of regional ﬂuctuations, and ﬁnd that variables like state-
speciﬁc military spending and ﬂuctuations in the price of oil interacted with cross-state diﬀerences
in the mix of oil-sensitive industries have signiﬁcant explanatory power (Davis, Loungani, and
Mahidhara, 1997). If, as seems reasonable, these variables are uncorrelated with the de-meaned
youth share of the population, they will not bias the estimates of the variable of interest, the
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The null hypothesis is that the elasticity γ is zero. Because I allow for both state
and year ﬁxed eﬀects, I can only estimate γ to the extent that logshareit cannot
be predicted by state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Since about 94.9% ofthe variation
in logshareit is predicted by the two ﬁxed eﬀects, only the remaining 5.1% ofthe
variation can be used to estimate γ. However, given the fairly long sample period
ofnineteen years and large cross section of51 ‘states’ (including the District of
Columbia), this is enough to obtain tight estimates.
3.2 OLS Results
Panel A ofTable 1 shows the results f rom estimating equation (1) using aggregate
unemployment and participation rate data from 1970 to 1996. The estimated elas-
ticity ofthe unemployment rate with respect to the youth share ofthe population is
approximately -1, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero at any standard conﬁdence level.
This is best interpreted as a partial equilibrium correlation. A one percent increase
in the youth share ofthe working age population in one state is correlated with
a one percent reduction in the unemployment rate in that state. The elasticity of
the participation rate has the opposite sign and is much smaller, although it is still
statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero. A one percent increase in the youth
share ofthe working age population is correlated with a 0.05 percent increase in the
participation rate in that state.
For both regressions, both the state and year ﬁxed eﬀects are highly signiﬁcant,
justifying the panel data analysis. One can also compare the results of the ﬁxed
eﬀects OLS regression with a random eﬀects feasible generalized least squares esti-
mate. The latter is more eﬃcient ifthe random eﬀects are uncorrelated with any
omitted variables, but will otherwise be inconsistent; while the former is consistent
in either case. A Hausman speciﬁcation test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the random eﬀects model is consistent in the unemployment rate equation; however,
the coeﬃcient estimates are not signiﬁcantly changed compared with the ﬁxed ef-
fects estimates. On the other hand, in the participation rate equation, the Hausman
test strongly rejects random year eﬀects. To avoid these inconsistent estimates, I use
elasticity γ. Finally, I have veriﬁed that the racial composition of a state has no eﬀect on the
youth share coeﬃcient, and so can safely be omitted.
-7-The Impact ofYoung Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market Robert Shimer
ﬁxed eﬀects estimates throughout the remainder ofthe paper, possibly sacriﬁcing
some eﬃciency. Since almost all ofthe estimates are statistically signiﬁcant, this
should not aﬀect my conclusions.
The estimates in Panel A suﬀer from autocorrelated residuals, because an unex-
pected increase in the unemployment rate only gradually disappears as the laid-oﬀ
workers ﬁnd new jobs. A regression ofthe OLS residual ˆεit on itselflagged one
period, ˆ εit−1, yields a coeﬃcient of0 .73. A similar regression ofthe residuals in the
participation equation yields a coeﬃcient of0 .72. There is no evidence ofhigher
ordered autocorrelation, so Panel B performs an AR(1) correction. The point esti-
mates ofthe elasticities are statistically unchanged. Although the standard errors
are somewhat larger, the results remain signiﬁcant. All the results in the remainder
ofthe paper include an AR(1) correction.
There is also a mechanical bias in the estimates in Table 1. Since young workers
have a higher unemployment rate, an increase in the youth share ofthe population
will raise the aggregate unemployment rate. On the other hand, young workers
generally have low participation rates, so an increase in the youth share ofthe
population will lower the aggregate participation rate. Similarly, male and female
labor market participation rates systematically diﬀer; and the relationship between
them changes with age. This too may bias the estimates in Table 1.
To address these concerns, I estimate equation (1) separately for seven diﬀerent
age groups and both sexes. Column I in Table 2 shows the results. For the data
availability reasons described in Section 2, I use the sample period 1978–96. In
each case, the independent variable ofinterest is the youth share ofthe working age
population. The dependent variable is the unemployment or participation rate ofa
particular age and sex group in the state at that point in time. The ﬁrst row also
shows the results from a regression of the aggregate unemployment or participation
rate on the youth share using this shorter sample period.
The results are qualitatively similar for almost all age and sex groups. An in-
crease in the youth share ofthe population is correlated with a statistically signiﬁ-
cant reduction in the unemployment rate ofall workers contingent on their age and
sex (Panel A). Quantitatively, an increase in the youth share ofthe population has
twice as large an eﬀect on the unemployment rate ofolder workers as on younger
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workers. The elasticity ofthe teenage unemployment rate is -1.3, and the elasticity
ofthe unemployment rate f or workers age 45–64 is -2.5. As a result, the relative un-
employment rate ofyoung workers rises in response to an increase in the youth share
ofthe population, consistent with the ‘cohort crowding’ hypothesis (Korenman and
Neumark, 1997). However, the absolute decline in the youth unemployment rate
is not consistent with the standard hypothesis. The response ofmale and f emale
unemployment to changes in the youth share is the same.
An increase in the youth share ofthe population is correlated with a much larger
increase in the participation rate ofyoung workers than ofolder workers (Panel B).
Since the results in Panel A suggest that labor market conditions improve more for
older workers than for younger workers, one might expect the opposite relationship.
However, the participation rate results make sense ifyoung workers have a more
elastic labor supply. Again, the response ofmale and f emale unemployment is
about the same for each age group.
Finally, a reduction in the unemployment rate and an increase in the partici-
pation rate imply an increase in the employment-population ratio. One can show
that the employment-population ratio is higher for each age and sex group when the
youth share ofthe population is higher. Thus these are generally periods oftight
labor markets.
3.3 IV Results
One possible explanation for the results in Column I of Table 2, is that young
workers who are eager to participate in the labor market ﬂock to states with low
unemployment rates. Note that the story is not as simple as saying that state i
always has low unemployment rates, so young workers move to state i. A persistently
low unemployment rate would be captured by state i’s ﬁxed eﬀect. The concern is
more subtle: a temporary reduction in the unemployment rate in i might temporarily
attract more young workers to i.
I control for this possibility using instrumental variables (IV). I look for exoge-
nous variation in the youth share ofthe working age population, share it,c a u s e db y
the birth rate in that state 16 to 24 years before. More precisely, birthit in year
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t = 1978 is equal to the sum ofthe number ofbirths per person in state i from
1954 to 1962. A simple regression oflogshare it on logbirthit and a constant yields
an elasticity of0 .647, with a standard error of0 .007. This single variable explains
86.0% ofthe variation in the youth share. Including state and year ﬁxed eﬀects
lowers the elasticity estimate to 0.595 with a standard error of0.016, and the R2
rises to 0.977. Since the elasticity is less than one, an increase in the birth rate leads
to a smaller increase in the youth share 16–24 years later, a tendency towards mean
reversion. However, the instrument is a remarkably good predictor off uture youth
shares.
Column II ofTable 2 then estimates the basic regression using IV instead ofOLS.
None ofthe results are signiﬁcantly changed, and the magnitudes are generally
larger, not smaller. A one percent exogenous increase in the youth share ofthe
population, caused by an increase in the birth rate 16 to 24 years before, reduces
the unemployment rate ofteenagers by one percent and ofolder workers by two
or three percent. It raises the participation rate ofteenage workers by about half
a percent, and slightly raises the participation rate ofolder workers. Because the
standard errors are somewhat larger using IV, a few of the elasticity estimates are
not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Since lagged birth rates and state and year ﬁxed eﬀects predict 97.7% ofthe
variation in the youth share ofthe population, the youth share ofthe population
cannot ﬂuctuate too much in response to short term economic conditions. Thus it
should not be too surprising that IV and OLS estimates are similar. Indeed, the
predictability off uture youth population shares suggests that instrumental variables
may be inappropriate. Ifthe youth share ofthe population is exogenous, OLS is a
consistent and eﬃcient estimator, while IV is ineﬃcient. I examine whether this is
the case using a two-stage procedure proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon (1993).
In the ﬁrst stage, predict the youth share ofthe population f rom a regression on all
the exogenous variables, here the lagged birth rates and state and year dummies.
Then in the second stage, regress the unemployment or participation rate on the
youth share ofthe population, the predicted value ofthe youth share, and state and
year dummies. Ifthe predicted value ofthe youth share enters signiﬁcantly into this
regression, then we can reject the null hypothesis that the youth share is exogenous.
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The ﬁnal column in Table 2 shows the p-values from this exogeneity test, which
is just the p-value for a t-test of whether the coeﬃcient on the predicted youth
share is diﬀerent from zero. One can reject exogeneity at the ten percent conﬁdence
level in only eleven of44 cases, and at the ﬁve percent level in only f our cases.
Moreover, in about halfthe cases where one can reject exogeneity ofthe youth
share at conventional signiﬁcance levels, IV has the ‘wrong’ eﬀect on the elasticity
estimates. Exogenous variation in the youth share has a more negative eﬀect on the
unemployment rate, and a more positive eﬀect on the participation rate, than does
endogenous variation. I conclude that OLS is a consistent and eﬃcient estimator,
and use it throughout the remainder ofthe paper. 4
3.4 Robustness
This section describes several robustness checks on the results in Table 2. All support
the preceding results.5
Regional Fluctuations
Shocks are likely to be correlated according to economic, cultural, and geographic
proximity. This may bias down the standard errors reported in Table 2. Ideally, one
could estimate the complete cross-sectional variance-covariance matrix ofshocks,
but this is impossible because I have fewer time observations than states. Instead,
I try several alternative controls for regional economic ﬂuctuations.
4This may appear to contradict the conclusion of Blanchard and Katz (1992), that regional
labor markets adjust to shocks via migration. There are two possible reconciliations. First, their
ﬁndings concern relatively long term adjustment, while with my methodology, long term adjust-
ment is dumped into state ﬁxed eﬀects. Second, the population variables that I use are estimated
by the Census Bureau in years between decennial censuses. To the extent that the Bureau relies
on lagged birth rates to construct the population variables, I will be unable to observe tempo-
rary population ﬂuctuations. As a result, the measured youth share of the population is already
somewhat exogenous to current labor market conditions.
5I have performed, but do not report, a number of other robustness checks. These include
population weighted regressions, quantile regressions to control for outliers, and a variety of sub-
sample estimates: the 41 small states; within census regions; during recessions or expansions; and
in each half of the sample period. None of the results contradict the main ﬁndings, although in
some cases (e.g. within the East and Midwest census regions) the standard errors explode and the
point estimates are imprecise. This reﬂects the fact that much of the usable variation in population
shares is at the regional level, as pointed out in Columns I and II of Table 3.
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First, I include a full set of census division/year dummies in the basic regression.
The Census Bureau divides the country into nine geographic divisions, ranging in
size from three states (New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania) to nine (South
Atlantic division). Let d(i) denote the census division ofstate i. I include a separate
year ﬁxed eﬀect for each census region, βd(i),t, constant for any observation in census
division d and year t and zero otherwise. This will pick up regional ﬂuctuations.6
Column I ofTable 3 shows the results f rom estimating this equation. 7 Only
one ofthe point estimates changes signiﬁcantly (at the ﬁve percent level) f rom the
point estimates in Table 2. This is what we would expect, since regional ﬂuctuations
should be uncorrelated with the youth population share.
More important is what happens to the standard errors. Including all these
extra dummy variables comes at some cost in terms of degrees of freedom. If,
in fact, shocks are independent across states within census divisions, this should
raise the estimated standard errors by a little over 9%. On the other hand, to
the extent the results are driven exclusively by ﬂuctuations within census divisions,
the standard errors should blow up, which would indicate that the standard errors
reported in Table 2 are too small. We ﬁnd that in the unemployment rate equation,
the standard errors increase by about 15% on average, while in the participation
rate equation they increase by 34%, evidence for a weak correlation of shocks within
census divisions. However, this correlation is not so large that it alters the statistical
signiﬁcance ofany ofthe results.
A complementary way to control for regional economic ﬂuctuations is to aggre-
gate all the data to the regional level and rerun the regression. That is, I regress
the log unemployment rate in region d and year t, on region and year dummies and
the log youth share ofthe working age population in region d and year t.T h i s
aggregation comes at an even larger cost in terms ofdegrees off reedom, since we
are throwing away over 82% ofthe observations. However, this should completely
eliminate any concern about correlation ofshocks.
The results are presented in Column II ofTable 3. An exogenous increase in
6Allowing for state-speciﬁc time trends yields similar results.
7I omit the results for sex-speciﬁc unemployment and participation rates to avoid overwhelming
the reader with numbers. The results are again similar.
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the youth share ofthe population in a census division causes a decrease in the
unemployment rate, possibly larger for older workers than for teenagers. It causes
an increase in the youth participation rate, and we cannot discern a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on prime age participation. This conﬁrms the robustness ofthe main results.
Estimates Using Only Large States
Recall that the BLS uses ‘time series methods’ to calculate the unemployment and
participation rate in many states. Is it possible that this estimation procedure is
somehow driving the results? One way to answer that question, is by running the
regression using only data from the ten large states where the rates are computed
directly from the CPS. Column III of Table 3 reports those results. They are
consistent with the full sample estimates, eliminating this cause for concern.
Sectoral Composition of Employment Growth
An increase in the youth share ofthe population causes an increase in participation
and a sharp decline in the unemployment rate, and so it must lead to an increase
in total employment. I test this using state level data on total employment from
1970–97, also available from the BLS website. Regressing log total employment on
the log youth share and year and state dummies yields an elasticity of0.36 (Table 4,
Panel A); controlling for endogeneity of the youth share raises the estimate slightly.
Moreover, upon breaking employment down by sector, one sees that the response is
widespread, with the strongest eﬀect on construction, and a slightly weaker impact
on manufacturing, wholesale and retail trade, and services. This conclusion holds
whether we estimate the elasticity ofthe level ofemployment (Panel A) or the
sectoral employment-working age population ratio (Panel B).
The large response ofconstruction employment might suggest that the strong
labor market conditions are due to a construction boom, as residential and com-
mercial real estate are built to accommodate a large youth cohort. However, ifthat
were the case, the price oflabor should be bid up, causing substitution away f rom
employment in other sectors. This is inconsistent with the evidence in Table 4.
Instead, the economy-wide increase in employment suggests a growth in labor de-
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mand, which then leads to a construction boom. The large response ofconstruction
employment is simply due to the fact that that sector is highly cyclical.
3.5 Summary
Cross-state evidence suggests that an exogenous one percent increase in the youth
share ofthe population in a state will reduce the unemployment rate ofworkers in
that state by over one percent, with the strongest eﬀect on prime age unemployment
and a somewhat weaker eﬀect on young workers. It will also raise the participation
rate ofyoung workers by at least one-third ofa percent, with a smaller and less
signiﬁcant eﬀect on prime age workers.
These elasticities not only have an unexpected sign, but they are very large.
Consider the regression ofthe log youth share ofthe population, share it, on state
and year dummies. The residual has a standard error of0.033, so a one standard
deviation increase in the youth share ofthe population, relative to that state’s
history and to the youth share in other states at that point in time, will reduce the
unemployment rate in that state by about six percent and raise the participation
rate ofyoung workers by about one percent.
The implied impact ofthe baby boom on the aggregate unemployment rate is
simply enormous. The youth population share bottomed out at 18.0% in 1953,
rose to 26.7% by 1976, and has since fallen back to 19.0%. Roughly speaking, this
change should have ﬁrst halved and then doubled the prime age unemployment rate!
However, one must be cautious with this calculation, since the estimated elasticities
concern changes in the youth population share in one state relative to others, while
the baby boom was an international phenomenon that may have induced general
equilibrium eﬀects.
4 The Endogenous Fertility Hypothesis
The empirical ﬁndings contradict the existing literature on cohort crowding. Why
might an increase in the youth share ofthe population caused by an increase in the
birth rate twenty years earlier lead to a reduction in the unemployment rate and an
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increase in the participation rate? One possibility is that a third factor aﬀects the
birth rate now and will later alter unemployment and participation rates.
Birth rates are endogenously determined by the collective decisions ofparents.
Suppose parents expect a strong labor market in the future. This might lead to an
increase in fertility today, as parents anticipate being able to support more children,
or as they have more children in an eﬀort for the family to take advantage of the
economy. I label this the endogenous fertility hypothesis.
While endogenity off ertility is undoubtedly important in many situations, it
seems unlikely to be driving the empirical ﬁndings. These are ‘diﬀerence-in-diﬀer-
ence’ estimates. Parents in state i from year t − 24 to year t − 16 must anticipate
low unemployment in state i in year t, relative to the norm in state i and relative
to other states in year t. Such precise beliefs seem implausible.
To get at this more concretely, I try other demographic variables on the right
hand side ofthe regression. I start with share
5−15
it , the number of5–15 year olds
in state i and year t as a fraction of the working age population 16–64. The ﬁrst
line in each block ofTable 5 shows that an increase in the share of‘school children’
in a state raises the unemployment rate and reduces the participation rate for each
working age group, opposite to the previous results. Next I try share
25−34
it ,t h e
share of25–34 year olds in the working age population. This yields qualitatively
similar results, although they are quantitatively and statistically less signiﬁcant.
The timing ofbirths implied by these results is so precise and the f oresight required
is so incredible, that I reject the endogenous fertility hypothesis.
The question remains as to why the share ofschool children and 25–34 year
olds enters signiﬁcantly into these regressions. One possibility is the mechanical
negative correlation between these share variables and the share of16–24 year olds.
To see whether this is the case, I include the share of16–24 year olds in the two
regressions, and report the results in the remaining lines ofeach block. The eﬀect of
the share of25–34 year olds largely goes away. However, the eﬀect ofschool children
appears to be robust, and slightly dampens the eﬀect of16–24 year olds. Again,
this result is quite surprising. One would expect the parents ofschool children to be
more attached to the labor market, but an increase in the number ofschool children
raises the unemployment rate and reduces the participation rate in a state for all
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age groups. Although a detailed exploration ofthis ﬁnding goes beyond the scope
ofthis paper, I will brieﬂy return to it at the end ofthe theory developed in the
next section.
5 The Fluid Labor Market Hypothesis
Ifthe birth rate is exogenous, then the relationship between the youth population
share and the unemployment and participation rates must be interpreted causally.
The most obvious causal connection is that an exogenous increase in the youth
share ofthe population leads to more job creation, reducing the unemployment
rate and raising the participation rate. However, simple theories ofequilibrium
unemployment do not admit such behavior (Pissarides, 1990). An increase in the
youth share ofthe population directly raises the unemployment rate, because young
workers are unemployed more frequently. Even if job creation responds more than
proportionately, as would be the case ifthere is some f orm ofincreasing returns
to scale in the labor market (Diamond, 1982), this cannot lead to a decline in the
aggregate unemployment rate, or it would choke oﬀ the new job creation.
Instead, there must both be increasing returns to scale and a reason for ﬁrms
to create jobs even when unemployment falls.8 This section uses a very simple
model to illustrate a plausible mechanism. Younger workers are more likely to
be mismatched with their current employer. Having many mismatched workers
encourages job creation, since ﬁrms that locate in such markets ﬁnd it relatively
easy to attract employees.
8Some readers will strongly oppose the increasing returns to scale assumption. Indeed, the
standard theory of equilibrium unemployment (Pissarides, 1990) assumes constant returns to scale,
typically justifying this by the empirical work of Blanchard and Diamond (1989). However, this
ﬁnding is controversial. Hall (1989) questions it in his discussion of their paper. And in a later
paper, Blanchard and Diamond (1992) recognize that “the process through which workers and jobs
ﬁnd each other, surely has increasing returns over some range.” The empirical evidence in this
paper supports this view.
-16-The Impact ofYoung Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market Robert Shimer
5.1 Model
There are two types ofagents, workers and ﬁrms. Let L(t) denote the measure of
workers in the economy at time t and θ(t)L(t) denote the measure ofﬁrms. Both
types ofagents are risk neutral, inﬁnitely lived, and discount the f uture at rate
r>0. Each agent may be in one ofthree states: unmatched, mismatched, or well
matched. While unmatched, an agent earns nothing. A mismatched agent (worker
or ﬁrm) gets x1 > 0. A well matched agent gets x2 >x 1.9 In addition, new workers
are born, unmatched, at rate n(t) > 0, so L(t)=L0e
R t
0 n(s)ds. New ﬁrms enter the
market by paying a one-time ﬁxed cost c. The assumption that the supply ofjobs
is perfectly elastic is reasonable in this setting, since the empirical evidence looks at
cross-state variation in birth rates. A change in the birth rate in one state will lead
to a ﬂow ofcapital f rom other states, but will not change the cost ofcapital.
Let α1(t) denote the fraction of workers who are mismatched and α2(t)d e n o t e
the fraction who are well matched in steady state, so 1−α1(t)−α2(t)i st h efr a c t i o n
who are unmatched. Simple accounting shows that at time t,afr a c t i o no f ﬁ r m s
(θ(t) − α1(t) − α2(t))/θ(t) are unmatched, while fractions α1(t)/θ(t)a n dα2(t)/θ(t)
ofthe ﬁrms are in bad and good matches, respectively.
These fractions are limited by search frictions. Workers and ﬁrms periodically
meet and have an opportunity to match. A ﬁrm meets a worker at a rate η(θ),
decreasing in the contemporaneous ﬁrm-worker ratio θ(t). A worker meets a ﬁrm
at an increasing rate µ(θ) ≡ θη(θ). In each case, the potential partner is drawn
randomly from the appropriate population, regardless of the partner’s current match
quality. The two agents then realize the quality oftheir match; it is good with
probability p, independent across workers and ﬁrms and over time.
Finally, potential partners match ifit improves both agents’ state. That is, a
good match is accepted unless either agent is already in a good match. A mismatch
is accepted only ifboth agents are unmatched. Thus it is easier to match when the
fraction of unmatched or mismatched agents is high. As in Diamond (1982), this
‘thick-market externality’ is the source ofincreasing returns to scale.
Whenever a matched agent accepts a new partner, her old partner becomes
9Note that these payoﬀs are not transferable. This assumption simpliﬁes the analysis by elimi-
nating wage determination issues.
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unmatched.10 There is no recall ofpast partners. One can think ofa worker leaving
a mismatch for a good match as a quit; a ﬁrm leaving a mismatch for a good match
as a layoﬀ; unmatched workers as unemployed; and unmatched ﬁrms as vacant.
Equilibrium demands two things. First, the two state variables α1(t)a n dα2(t),
the fraction of mismatched and well matched workers, are determined by worker
and ﬁrm ﬂows and initial conditions αi(0) = αi0, i ∈{ 1,2}. And second, the value
ofcreating a new unmatched ﬁrm must always equal the startup cost c.
This model builds on work by Burdett and Mortensen (1998), who introduce
on-the-job-search into an otherwise standard search framework. There are two sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences between the models. First, their model is more ambitious, in
that it endogenizes the division ofmatch surplus, and demonstrates that wage dis-
persion is an equilibrium phenomenon. I treat the division ofsurplus as exogenous,
and take wage dispersion (x1 <x 2) as a primitive. Second, I only allow ﬁrms to hire
one worker, and thus develop a theory oftemporary employment. In the Burdett-
Mortensen model, the marginal product oflabor is constant, so ﬁrms never ﬁre
workers. One can show that without temporary employment, this framework can-
not explain a decline in the aggregate unemployment rate in response to an increase
in the birth rate.
5.2 State Variables
A good match is an absorbing state in this economy. The measure ofgood matches
increases when unmatched or mismatched ﬁrms meet unmatched or mismatched









The right hand side ofthis equation describes the ﬂow ofnew good matches at time
t.T h e r ei saﬂ o wµ(θ(t))L(t) meetings by workers, a fraction 1−α2(t)o fw h i c ha r e
not well matched; and a fraction (θ(t)−α2(t))/θ(t) ofthose meetings are with ﬁrms
10These matching patterns are eﬃcient if x2 > 2x1. Otherwise, output might be higher if
mismatched agents did not match with other mismatched agents. However, since utility is non-
transferable, a spurned partner can still not prevent the termination of her match.
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that are not well matched; and a fraction p ofthose meetings result in a good match.
Since dL(t)/dt = n(t)L(t), the labor force cancels from the above equation, yielding








p − n(t)α2(t)( 2 )
The expression for the measure of mismatches is more complicated. The share
ofmismatches decreases due to new births, quits, and layoﬀs. It increases when




1 − α1(t) − α2(t)
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The ﬁrst term on the right hand side reﬂects the fact that new mismatches occur only
ifboth partners are unmatched. The ﬁrst term on the second line is the adjustment
for new births. The second term is the probability that the worker quits for a good
match. The third term is the probability that the ﬁrm lays oﬀ the worker for a good
match. Equations (2) and (3) can be solved numerically for α1 and α2 in terms of
the ﬁrm-worker ratio θ and initial conditions.
Now consider the eﬀect ofa permanent increase in the birth rate n(t), holding
the ﬁrm-worker ratio constant. From equation (2), this will push down the steady
state share good matches, as young workers have not yet had a chance to ﬁnd them.
It will raise the share ofmismatches, since there are more workers passing through
that intermediate stage. And it will push up the unemployment rate, as many
workers will not yet have even found a ﬁrst job, or will be suﬀering from layoﬀs.
5.3 Entry
For a ﬁrm, the reduction in the share ofgood matches is advantageous. When ﬁrms
meet well matched workers, their overtures are always rejected. Instead, ﬁrms prefer
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to operate in environments with more mismatched or ummatched workers. To show
this formally, calculate the value of a ﬁrm in diﬀerent states, letting W0(t), W1(t),
and W2(t) denote the expected present value ofproﬁts f or an unmatched ﬁrm, a
mismatched ﬁrm, and a well-matched ﬁrm, respectively.
A well-matched ﬁrm earns x2 forever, yielding a payoﬀ W2(t) ≡ x2/r.A m i s -
matched ﬁrm earns x1, but may suﬀer a quit or be able to create a good job.
















The ﬂow value ofa ﬁrm in a mismatch is equal to the sum ofthe current payoﬀ x1,
plus the probability that its employee realizes a good match with a ﬁrm not already
in a good match, times the capital loss associated with becoming unmatched, plus
the probability that the ﬁrm realizes a good match with a worker not already well-
matched, times that capital gain. Similarly, the value ofan unmatched ﬁrm satisﬁes:

















The ﬁrst term is the probability ofrealizing a good match with a worker not already
in a good match, times the resulting capital gain. The second term is the probability
ofrealizing a bad match with an unmatched worker, times that capital gain.
For a given time-path of θ, α1,a n dα2, equations (4) and (5) can be solved for W0
and W1. For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that W0(t)=c for all t,
the free entry condition. Thus an equilibrium is a tuple of functions {α1,α 2,W 1,θ}
that satisﬁes equations (2)–(5) with W0(t) ≡ c and W2(t) ≡ x2/r.
In practice, I solve this system numerically using a simple algorithm. Conjecture
a path for the ﬁrm-worker ratio, perhaps from a steady-state solution. Use this to
calculate a candidate path for the state variables from equations (2) and (3). Then
under the assumption that W0(t) ≡ c and W2(t) ≡ x2/r, solve equation (4) for
W1(t) and invert equation (5) to solve for θ(t). Ifthe solution coincides with the
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initial guess, this is the equilibrium. Otherwise, perturb the initial guess towards
the ﬁrm-worker ratio that comes out ofthe algorithm, and restart. In practice, this
algorithm rapidly converges to a unique equilibrium for any initial conditions.
5.4 Simulation
Clearly this model is too simple to be taken quantitatively seriously. However,
a simulation shows how an increase in the population growth rate can lead to a
suﬃcient increase in job creation, so as to reduce unemployment.
Let µ(θ)=1 0
√
θ and η(θ)=1 0 /
√
θ.T a k ex1 =1a n dx2 =2 ,w i t hp =0 .04,
so few potential matches are good. Also let the interest rate r =0 .05 and set the
population growth rate n =0 .02, reasonable numbers for annual data. Finally, set
the entry cost c = 30. Run the model for many periods, so the system converges to
a steady state, independent ofthe initial conditions. In this steady state, θ =1 .00,
while 5.2% ofworkers are unmatched; 14.8% are mismatched; and 80.1% have f ound
good matches.
Now consider an anticipated permanent increase in the population growth rate
to n =0 .03 in year T, starting from the n =0 .02 steady state. Ifthe ﬁrm-worker
ratio did not change, the resulting increase in the youth population would eventually
raise the unemployment rate by 1.1 percentage points and the share ofmismatches
by 2.7 percentage points. However, this creates proﬁt opportunities for ﬁrms. In
response, θ increases to 1.05, which reduces the steady state unemployment rate to
4.5% and leaves the share ofmismatches at 17.7%. All workers beneﬁt f rom this
increase in θ, as it makes it easier to ﬁnd jobs when unmatched, to ﬁnd good jobs
when mismatched, and it reduces the chance that an employer will lay them oﬀ to
hire another worker.
This is a dynamic model, so I can look not only at the new steady state, but at the
dynamic adjustment path (Figure 1). Since ﬁrms enter the market in anticipation of
the high population growth rate, about 9% ofthe decline in unemployment occurs
before the increase in population growth in year T. The remaining adjustment takes
some time, although about 95% ofthe decline in unemployment happens by year
T + 10.
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I can also check whether the decline in unemployment rates is larger for young
or old workers. Since by assumption all newborn workers are unemployed regardless
ofthe birth rate or ﬁrm-worker ratio, it must in some sense be bigger f or old work-
ers. Indeed, in this example the change in the birth rate reduces the steady state
unemployment rate ofworkers with ten years oflabor market experience by 49%;
and the unemployment rate ofworkers with thirty years ofexperience by 69%; and
is generally a monotonic function of experience. This demonstrates that the model
is consistent with the empirical evidence that a change in the youth share ofthe
population has a bigger eﬀect on the prime age unemployment rate than the youth
unemployment rate (Table 2, Panel A).
5.5 Discussion
The simplicity ofthis model highlights its main elements. In a labor market with
many older workers in good matches, ﬁrms are reluctant to create jobs, because
they meet mismatched young workers too infrequently. The conclusion might seem
sensitive to the assumption that well-matched workers continue to meet ﬁrms. If
ﬁrms could focus their search on unmatched or mismatched workers, the mechanism
in this paper would disappear. Moreover, in this model, well matched workers have
nothing to gain by meeting ﬁrms, so it might be feasible for ﬁrms to avoid meeting
such workers.
Such an interpretation would take the model too literally. A straightforward
extension allows for many job qualities. Fairly well matched workers continue to
search because there is always a chance ofﬁnding a better job. Even ifthey can
reduce the time and eﬀort devoted to search as they climb the quality ladder, they
will still clog the labor market to some degree.
Another critique ofthe model is that it f ails to address the relationship between
the youth share ofthe population and the participation rate. However, a simple
extension to the model endogenizes workers’ participation decision. Assume that
more workers participate in the labor market when the expected value ofparticipat-
ing is higher. Then participation rates would also increase following an increase in
the birth rate, as the value ofworkers’ participation goes up when the ﬁrm-worker
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ratio θ increases.
This model also sheds some light on why the unemployment rate is higher when
the share ofschool children is higher. I oﬀer two conjectures. First, new parents
expend additional search eﬀort to make sure that they ﬁnd good jobs. By the time a
large cohort ofchildren is in school, the high average match quality will create a more
rigid labor market, reducing job creation and raising unemployment. Alternatively,
parents ofschool children are geographically less mobile, again creating a rigid labor
market.
6 Testing the Fluid Labor Market Hypothesis
A ﬁrst-order testable implication ofthe ﬂuid labor market hypothesis is that there
should be more voluntary quits in younger labor markets. Firms create more jobs
to take advantage ofmismatched workers, more ofwhom then quit their old jobs
to take new ones in equilibrium. Indeed, the eﬀect ofthe youth share ofthe labor
market on quits may be much larger than the eﬀect on the unemployment rate. In
the numerical simulation in the previous section, the increase in the birth rate from
2% to 3% raised the quit rate from 1.2% to 1.9%.11
An empirical test ofthis hypothesis would examine whether states with younger
labor markets have more job-to-job movement. Unfortunately, reliable worker ﬂow
data is unavailable on a state level. An alternative is to focus on the ﬂow of jobs.
When a worker quits her job, one ﬁrm decreases its employment level, while another
increases its employment. This should show up in the data as simultaneous job
creation and destruction.
I test the theory with gross job creation and job destruction data in the man-
ufacturing sector, using time series constructed from the Longitudinal Research
Database by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996). This includes annual obser-
vations for 49 states from 1973–88.12 J o bc r e a t i o ni ns t a t ei and year t measures
11The eﬀect on layoﬀs is ambiguous. With more ﬁrms in the market, a mismatched ﬁrm is less
likely to contact a new potential employee; on the other hand, that potential employee is more
likely to be unmatched or mismatched. In the numerical example, the layoﬀ rate increased from
1.2% to 1.5%. In any case, a layoﬀ (in the sense of the model) would not show up in the data set
I use, because the same ﬁrm simultaneously creates and destroys a job.
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the employment increase among expanding or newly created plants, expressed as
a percentage ofmanuf acturing employment in that state and year; job destruction
measures the employment decrease (a positive number) among contracting or closing
plants in state i and year t, again expressed as a percentage.
To test whether a younger state has more gross creation and destruction, I regress
the log ofjob creation and job destruction on the log youth share and a f ull set of
year and state dummies. The null hypothesis is that the elasticity ofthe creation and
destruction variables should be equal to zero, while the theory predicts a positive
value for both elasticities, and a larger value for the elasticity of creation than for
destruction, reﬂecting an increase in net job creation. Table 6 shows the results from
estimating the equation using OLS and IV. The point estimates are positive, and
the estimated elasticity ofjob creation is indeed larger than that ofjob destruction;
however, the estimated elasticity ofjob destruction is not statistically diﬀerent f rom
zero, nor are the estimated elasticities diﬀerent from each other.
The theory also predicts that an increase in the youth share should have a larger
eﬀect on the creation and destruction rate than on total employment growth. A
comparison of the point estimates here with the estimates for the manufacturing
sector in Table 4 oﬀers modest support for that prediction, although the diﬀerence
between the estimates is again not statistically signiﬁcant. I conclude that job cre-
ation and job destruction data do not contradict the ﬂuid labor market hypothesis,
and oﬀer some modest support.
7 Reconciliation with Previous Studies
Previous studies have found that an increase in the youth share of the population
raises the youth unemployment rate. For example, Korenman and Neumark (1997)
conclude from a cross-country data set that a one percent increase in the youth
share ofthe population raises the youth unemployment rate by about a third ofa
percentage point, although their estimate is not very signiﬁcantly diﬀerent than zero.
The major methodological diﬀerence between that study and this one, is that they
12No data are available for Hawaii and Rhode Island.
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include the prime age unemployment rate on the right hand side ofthe regression:
loguryouth
it = αi + βt + γ logshareit + δlogurprime
it + εit (6)
The dependent variable is the youth (16–24 years old) unemployment rate. The
prime age (25–54) unemployment rate is included on the right hand side,13 and the
youth share is instrumented with lagged birth rates.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to interpret the estimate of the elasticity γ ifchanges
in the youth share ofthe population cause changes in the prime age unemployment
rate, as the evidence in this paper suggests. Indeed, there is a good reason to
think that this methodology biases their estimate of γ upwards. Because there is
a positive correlation between prime age and youth unemployment rates over the
business cycle, one would expect to ﬁnd a positive coeﬃcient on δ, multiplying
the prime age unemployment rate. Then ifan increase in the youth share ofthe
population reduces both the prime age and the youth unemployment rate, part or
all ofthe eﬀect on the youth unemployment rate will be captured by δ.T h ev a r i a b l e
ofinterest γ may even become positive.
As conﬁrmation ofthis reasoning, Table 7 shows estimates ofequation (6) on
the standard 51 state, 19 year data set, using both OLS and instrumental variables.
Ifthe prime age unemployment rate is excluded f rom the regression, one obtains
estimates similar to those for 16–19 and 20–24 year olds in Table 2. But including
this endogenous variable biases the estimated coeﬃcient on the youth share towards
zero, as predicted. Instrumenting the youth share with lagged birth rates yields a
slightly positive coeﬃcient estimate.
I have focused on Korenman and Neumark (1997) because their methodology
is the most directly comparable with mine. However, many other authors have
assumed that the youth share ofthe population does not aﬀect the prime age unem-
ployment rate. For example, Flaim (1979) interprets a positive correlation between
the youth share ofthe population and the gap between the teenage and prime age
13I use these deﬁnitions of youth and prime age for consistency with Korenman and Neumark
(1997). The results are not sensitive to this choice. Also, Korenman and Neumark include the
prime age employment-population ratio on the right hand side. The results are not sensitive to
including that variable.
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unemployment rates in U.S. time series data as evidence that an increase in the
youth share ofthe population raises the teenage unemployment rate. More recently,
Shimer (1998) labels unemployment ‘demographic’ ifit cannot be predicted f rom a
linear regression on the prime age unemployment rate. Thus he presumes that the
prime age unemployment rate is unaﬀected by demographic changes.
While this hypothesis certainly does not hold across states in the U.S., it does
seem to hold in Korenman and Neumark’s (1997) cross-country data set, which has
information on unemployment and participation rates, youth population shares, and
lagged birth rates in 15 OECD countries14 for all or part 1970–94. To establish this,
I estimate equation (1) on that data set. Panel A ofTable 8 shows that although
the point estimates from the basic OLS ﬁxed eﬀects regression of the unemployment
rate on the youth share are negative, they are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
Instrumenting the youth share with lagged birth rates reverses the sign ofthis
elasticity. I conclude that there is no systematic relationship between the youth
population share and the unemployment rate in that data set; and one can reject
the elasticities estimated in U.S. data.
Panel B shows that the OLS-estimated impact ofthe youth share on the partic-
ipation rate is ambiguous, switching signs for diﬀerent age groups. However, the IV
estimates are positive and similar to the estimates on U.S. data — and surprisingly,
one can strongly reject exogeneity ofthe youth population share.
Why do cross-state data give such diﬀerent results than cross-country in the
unemployment rate regression? An interesting possibility is that there are eﬀects
missing from cross-state variation in the youth share of the population, which might
be present in cross-country data sets. For example, in a closed economy neoclassical
growth model, an increase in the population growth rate reduces the capital-labor
ratio and thus the wage rate. With search frictions, this manifests itself as an
increase in unemployment. However, with an open economy, capital would ﬂow
across regions so as to equalize the capital-labor ratio. Even ifone state has a
higher population growth rate than another, it would not have a lower capital-labor
14The countries are: Australia, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK, and the US. See their paper for details
on the data set.
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ratio or a higher unemployment rate. On the other hand, ifall states have a higher
population growth rate and international capital ﬂows are imperfect, the capital-
labor ratio would fall in the country, and the unemployment rate would increase.
Using cross-state data, this would get pushed into a year ﬁxed eﬀect, but a cross-
country time series would capture this eﬀect ofpopulation growth.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper argues that an increase in the youth share ofthe population causes
a sharp decline in the unemployment rate, particularly for older workers. It also
leads to an increase in the participation rate, especially for younger workers. This
is inconsistent with standard theories ofunemployment, which either predict no
relationship or the opposite relationship between these variables. However, it is
consistent with a theory ofthe labor market in which mismatch ofyoung workers is
important, and ﬁrms prefer to locate in markets with a lot of mismatch, because it
is easier to ﬁnd good employees in thicker labor markets.
One can interpret the empirical results in this paper as a test for thick market
externalities. The standard theory ofequilibrium unemployment, as summarized
in Pissarides (1990), assumes that the number ofmatches created in a period is
a constant returns to scale function of the number of unemployed workers and the
number ofvacant ﬁrms. This yields many strong predictions. For example, the equi-
librium ofsimple search and matching models is unique, and the economy rapidly
converges towards a steady state. The standard model also predicts that an exoge-
nous increase in the number ofjob searchers will have no eﬀect on job creation and
job destruction rates, although it will directly increase the aggregate unemployment
rate (Shimer, 1998).
In contrast, Diamond (1982) allows the matching function to have increasing
returns to scale. Multiple equilibria are then possible, and even with a unique
equilibrium, the labor market may substantially amplify external shocks. For this
reason, Hall (1989) declared that “economywide thick-market eﬀects are one ofthe
most promising ways to explain the business cycle.” Models with thick-market
eﬀects also predict that an increase in the number ofjob searchers will raise job
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creation and reduce job destruction rates. The aggregate unemployment rate may
even fall, as happens in the model developed in Section 5.
One can therefore test for thick market externalities by looking for exogenous
variation in the number ofjob searchers. Lagged changes in birth rates are an ideal
source ofvariation: First, there is substantial variation in birth rates over time and
across regions. Second, birth rates are easily measureable, and good data is widely
available. Third, lagged birth rates are unlikely to be aﬀected by current labor
market conditions, so there is hope ofestablishing a causal relationship. And ﬁnally,
the nature ofthe shock is unambiguous, e.g. the entry ofthe new cohort should be
anticipated. Exploiting this source ofvariation, this paper uncovers evidence that
contradicts the standard model with constant returns to scale, but is completely
consistent with the existence ofthick market externalities.
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Dependent Variable Youth Share N
A. Basic Regression
Unemployment Rate -1.028 (0.158) 1377
Participation Rate .052 (0.018) 1377
B. AR Correction
Unemployment Rate -.961 (0.261) 1290
Participation Rate .083 (0.029) 1290
Table 1: OLS estimates of equation (1) using data from 51 states from 1970–96. All
regressions include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Standard errors in parentheses.
-30-The Impact ofYoung Workers on the Aggregate Labor Market Robert Shimer
Column 1: OLS Column 2: IV
Dependent Variable Youth Share N Youth Share Np
A. Unemployment Rate
All Workers -1.246 (0.251) 918 -1.796 (0.305) 892 0.032
All -1.268 (0.259) 916 -1.023 (0.308) 890 0.063
16–19 Men -1.567 (0.400) 816 -1.098 (0.515) 790 0.077
Women -1.418 (0.374) 816 -0.601 (0.482) 790 0.002
All -1.633 (0.298) 918 -2.062 (0.350) 892 0.104
20–24 Men -1.799 (0.352) 918 -2.154 (0.413) 892 0.300
Women -1.588 (0.306) 918 -1.872 (0.364) 892 0.345
All -1.526 (0.290) 918 -1.928 (0.347) 892 0.162
25–34 Men -1.735 (0.362) 918 -2.152 (0.432) 892 0.265
Women -1.490 (0.280) 918 -1.689 (0.335) 892 0.417
All -1.832 (0.347) 918 -2.270 (0.419) 892 0.190
35–44 Men -1.895 (0.398) 918 -2.495 (0.479) 892 0.078
Women -2.012 (0.374) 918 -2.082 (0.451) 892 0.967
All -2.455 (0.365) 918 -2.753 (0.440) 892 0.327
45–54 Men -3.037 (0.476) 918 -3.399 (0.578) 890 0.351
Women -2.010 (0.379) 918 -2.268 (0.454) 892 0.428
All -2.472 (0.455) 918 -2.882 (0.552) 892 0.167
55–64 Men -3.074 (0.548) 918 -3.621 (0.666) 892 0.168
Women -2.407 (0.589) 918 -2.533 (0.716) 890 0.685
All -2.440 (0.687) 893 -1.842 (0.844) 870 0.234
65+ Men -2.984 (0.813) 843 -3.220 (0.965) 843 0.752
Women -2.152 (1.130) 751 -0.810 (1.426) 745 0.186
Table 2A (continued)
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Column 1: OLS Column 2: IV
Dependent Variable Youth Share N Youth Share Np
B. Participation Rate
All Workers 0.093 (0.029) 918 0.102 (0.035) 892 0.946
All 0.365 (0.084) 916 0.451 (0.101) 890 0.169
16–19 Men 0.414 (0.112) 816 0.558 (0.143) 790 0.135
Women 0.427 (0.127) 816 0.643 (0.163) 790 0.032
All 0.185 (0.036) 918 0.233 (0.043) 892 0.067
20–24 Men 0.172 (0.037) 918 0.193 (0.045) 892 0.383
Women 0.211 (0.042) 918 0.282 (0.067) 892 0.039
All 0.060 (0.024) 918 0.071 (0.028) 892 0.763
25–34 Men 0.026 (0.015) 918 0.027 (0.018) 892 0.947
Women 0.105 (0.045) 918 0.151 (0.055) 892 0.220
All 0.055 (0.024) 918 0.065 (0.029) 892 0.811
35–44 Men 0.040 (0.015) 918 0.029 (0.019) 892 0.243
Women 0.078 (0.046) 918 0.125 (0.056) 892 0.221
All 0.048 (0.028) 918 0.055 (0.033) 892 0.721
45–54 Men 0.056 (0.025) 918 0.046 (0.031) 892 0.816
Women 0.062 (0.056) 918 0.097 (0.067) 892 0.495
All 0.164 (0.058) 918 0.163 (0.070) 892 0.885
55–64 Men 0.169 (0.062) 918 0.178 (0.075) 892 0.861
Women 0.150 (0.087) 918 0.131 (0.105) 892 0.662
All -0.209 (0.163) 918 -0.411 (0.195) 892 0.023
65+ Men -0.143 (0.174) 918 -0.251 (0.205) 892 0.091
Women -0.303 (0.231) 918 -0.596 (0.278) 892 0.084
Table 2B
Table 2: OLS and IV estimates ofequation (1) using 19 years and 51 states, f or
seven diﬀerent age groups and both sexes. All regressions include state and year ﬁxed
eﬀects and an AR(1) correction. Sample sizes N vary due to missing observations in
1994–96. Standard errors in parentheses. p is the p-value in a Davidson-MacKinnon
(1993) exogeneity test.
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Column I. Column II. Column III.
Dependent Census Division/Year Aggregate
Variable Fixed Eﬀects Census Division Large States
A. Unemployment Rate
16–19 -1.065 (0.309) -1.863 (0.680) -1.704 (0.826)
20–24 -1.239 (0.322) -2.004 (0.789) -1.367 (0.975)
25–34 -1.130 (0.286) -2.519 (0.827) -1.436 (1.082)
35–44 -1.887 (0.382) -2.358 (0.959) -2.780 (1.162)
45–54 -2.163 (0.427) -2.653 (1.023) -3.063 (1.203)
55–64 -1.624 (0.532) -3.386 (1.190) -2.939 (1.234)
65+ -1.979 (0.937) -2.967 (1.113) -4.762 (1.198)
B. Participation Rate
16–19 0.398 (0.114) 0.423 (0.204) 0.443 (0.257)
20–24 0.208 (0.048) 0.242 (0.084) 0.228 (0.105)
25–34 0.121 (0.030) -0.048 (0.048) -0.098 (0.057)
35–44 0.091 (0.032) 0.013 (0.054) 0.012 (0.061)
45–54 0.046 (0.037) 0.101 (0.056) 0.120 (0.078)
55–64 0.117 (0.081) 0.347 (0.122) 0.468 (0.182)
65+ -0.190 (0.223) 0.311 (0.322) 0.170 (0.406)
Table 3: OLS estimates ofthe elasticities ofthe unemployment and participation
rates with respect to the youth share. Column I includes state and census divi-
sion/year ﬁxed eﬀects. Column II is aggregated to the census division level and
includes census division and year ﬁxed eﬀects. Column III is run only on the ten
large states for which the unemployment rate is calculated directly from the CPS,
and includes state and year ﬁxed eﬀects. All regressions have an AR(1) correction.
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Column I. OLS Column II. IV
Dependent Variable Youth Share Youth Share p
A. Employment Levels
Total Employment 0.360 (0.052) 0.445 (0.071) 0.502
Construction 1.389 (0.189) 1.343 (0.265) 0.237
Manufacturing 0.531 (0.070) 0.947 (0.104) 0.001
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.388 (0.050) 0.468 (0.072) 0.163
Services 0.319 (0.051) 0.457 (0.071) 0.707
Transportation & Public Utilities 0.252 (0.062) 0.183 (0.087) 0.015
Government 0.007 (0.039) 0.202 (0.061) 0.117
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 0.240 (0.073) 0.059 (0.102) 0.001
Mining 0.126 (0.262) -0.157 (0.390) 0.456
B. Employment Rates
Total Employment 0.147 (0.039) 0.284 (0.053) 0.123
Construction 1.139 (0.175) 1.192 (0.223) 0.501
Manufacturing 0.344 (0.071) 0.810 (0.105) 0.000
Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.199 (0.040) 0.326 (0.056) 0.413
Services 0.091 (0.045) 0.298 (0.067) 0.021
Transportation & Public Utilities 0.058 (0.055) 0.049 (0.076) 0.416
Government -0.160 (0.035) 0.078 (0.054) 0.000
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 0.046 (0.065) -0.076 (0.092) 0.023
Mining -0.207 (0.249) -0.402 (0.363) 0.642
Table 4: OLS and IV estimates ofthe elasticities ofemployment with respect to the
youth share for the entire economy and in subsets of states. All regressions include
state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and an AR(1) correction. Standard errors in parentheses.
The source ofemployment data is oﬃcial BLS time series f or employment in 1-digit
sectors. p is the p-value in a Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) exogeneity test.






1.443 (0.214) — —
— — 0.188 (0.230)
16–20 1.184 (0.236) -0.669 (0.270) —
— -1.813 (0.320) -0.751 (0.268)
1.072 (0.255) -0.959 (0.363) -0.322 (0.271)
1.629 (0.273) — —
— — 0.704 (0.273)
20–24 1.190 (0.296) -1.060 (0.323) —
— -1.874 (0.386) -0.326 (0.332)
1.256 (0.319) -0.889 (0.449) 0.189 (0.344)
1.378 (0.271) — —
— — 0.699 (0.274)
25–34 0.931 (0.295) -1.080 (0.318) —
— -1.781 (0.385) -0.340 (0.340)
0.949 (0.316) -1.032 (0.451) 0.053 (0.352)
2.127 (0.185) — —
— — 0.804 (0.327)
35–44 1.317 (0.347) -1.210 (0.375) —
— -2.160 (0.459) -0.439 (0.403)
1.362 (0.372) -1.095 (0.528) 0.129 (0.410)
2.179 (0.326) — —
— — 1.096 (0.325)
45–54 1.516 (0.346) -1.729 (0.389) —
— -2.673 (0.466) -0.290 (0.386)
1.656 (0.372) -1.368 (0.532) 0.393 (0.395)
1.602 (0.420) — —
— — 1.461 (0.387)
55–64 0.789 (0.447) -2.090 (0.503) —
— -2.196 (0.565) 0.386 (0.467)
1.092 (0.479) -1.350 (0.671) 0.830 (0.500)
2.660 (0.561) — —
— — 1.038 (0.547)
65+ 2.198 (0.610) -1.371 (0.735) —
— -2.472 (0.828) -0.046 (0.647)
2.589 (0.663) -0.462 (0.958) 1.010 (0.685)
Table 5A (continued)






-0.348 (0.076) — —
— — -0.322 (0.072)
16–20 -0.245 (0.084) 0.238 (0.094) —
— 0.213 (0.106) -0.208 (0.091)
-0.357 (0.087) -0.076 (0.126) -0.350 (0.095)
-0.127 (0.034) — —
— — -0.149 (0.031)
20–24 -0.063 (0.037) 0.154 (0.041) —
— 0.122 (0.046) -0.087 (0.038)
-0.109 (0.039) 0.037 (0.054) -0.131 (0.041)
-0.027 (0.022) — —
— — -0.041 (0.021)
25–34 -0.002 (0.025) 0.059 (0.027) —
— 0.052 (0.031) -0.011 (0.027)
-0.007 (0.026) 0.047 (0.038) -0.014 (0.029)
-0.057 (0.022) — —
— — -0.029 (0.021)
35–44 -0.043 (0.025) 0.033 (0.027) —
— 0.057 (0.031) 0.003 (0.027)
-0.049 (0.027) 0.018 (0.038) -0.017 (0.029)
-0.057 (0.025) — —
— — -0.045 (0.023)
45–54 -0.046 (0.028) 0.026 (0.031) —
— 0.025 (0.035) -0.031 (0.030)
-0.067 (0.030) -0.027 (0.042) -0.058 (0.032)
-0.135 (0.053) — —
— — -0.035 (0.050)
55–64 -0.085 (0.059) 0.122 (0.065) —
— 0.228 (0.074) 0.088 (0.063)
-0.063 (0.063) 0.178 (0.089) 0.062 (0.068)
-0.157 (0.150) — —
— — 0.460 (0.139)
65+ -0.309 (0.165) -0.363 (0.180) —
— 0.212 (0.206) 0.575 (0.177)
-0.130 (0.176) 0.108 (0.248) 0.521 (0.190)
Table 5B
Table 5: OLS regressions including additional measures ofthe youth share. All
regressions include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects and an AR(1) correction. Standard
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Column I. OLS Column II. IV
Dependent Variable Youth Share Youth Share p
Job Creation 0.775 (0.371) 1.506 (0.993) 0.492
Job Destruction 0.676 (0.416) 0.917 (1.009) 0.877
Table 6: OLS and IV estimates ofthe elasticity ofjob creation and destruction with
respect to the youth share. Both regressions include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects
and an AR(1) correction. Standard errors in parentheses. p is the p-value in a
Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) exogeneity test.
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Column I. OLS Column II. IV
Youth Share Prime Unemploy. Youth Share Prime Unemploy. p
-1.310 (0.269) — -1.354 (0.316) — 0.868
-0.251 (0.171) 0.561 (0.027) 0.096 (0.211) 0.573 (0.028) 0.000
Table 7: Dependent Variable: Youth unemployment rate. OLS and IV estimates
ofthe elasticity ofthe unemployment rate with respect to the youth share and the
prime age unemployment rate. All regressions include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects
and an AR(1) correction. Standard errors in parentheses. p is the p-value in a
Davidson-MacKinnon (1993) exogeneity test.
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Column I. OLS Column II. IV
Dependent Variable Youth Share N Youth Share Np
A. Unemployment Rate
15–24 -0.173 (0.479) 319 0.443 (0.767) 317 0.351
25–54 -0.300 (0.546) 319 0.337 (0.930) 317 0.459
55–64 -0.173 (0.591) 314 0.013 (0.791) 312 0.392
B. Participation Rate
15–24 0.130 (0.079) 319 0.463 (0.181) 317 0.025
25–54 -0.137 (0.028) 319 0.079 (0.071) 317 0.000
55–64 -0.108 (0.076) 314 0.146 (0.155) 317 0.066
Table 8: OLS and IV estimates ofequation (1) using 25 years and 15 OECD countries
for three diﬀerent age groups. All regressions include state and year ﬁxed eﬀects, an
AR(1) correction, and dummy variables to account for changes in some of the data
series. Standard errors in parentheses. p is the p-value in a Davidson-MacKinnon
(1993) exogeneity test.
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Figure 1: The dynamic response ofthe ﬁrm-worker ratio, unemployment rate, and
mismatched rate to an anticipated permanent increase in the population growth
rate from 0.02 to 0.03 in period 50.
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